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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LUDVIG V. MIKKELSEN, MARIE MIK-
KELSEN and CHARLES L. JOHNSON, 
Plain tiffs-Appellants, 
-v-
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and 
WEBER COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALI-





BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants initiated action in the Second Judi-
cial District Court of \/\1 eber County as follows: 
(1) Petition for a permanent injunction against 
the Weber County Board of Equalization to restrain 
said Board from applying Senate Bill 30; and 
(2) A class action for a declaratory judgment 
to have Senate Bill 30 declared unconstitutional, or 
in the alternative, that the bill be clarified in its ap-
plication to appellants. 
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The Utah State Tax Commission moved for dis-
missal of both the petition and the class action or 
in the alternative, that if said Motion fail, that Senate 
Bill 30 be sustained constitutional. The Weber 
County Board of Equalization sought clarification of 
Senate Bill 30. 
DISPOSITION 1N THE LO\IVER COURT 
The case was tried to the court, Honorable John 
F. Wahlquist presiding on the 19th day of Tune 1967. 
The court sustained the constitutionality of Utah 
Code Ann. ~ 59--7-2 (Supp. 1967), hereinafter referred 
to as Senate Bill 30; dissolved the temporary re-
straining order, declared Senate Bill 30 operative in 
1967 while using the June 7th filing date of the 
former law; and ordered that the $1500.00 income 
limitation applied to an individual and the total in-
come should be apportioned between husband and 
wife where the property is jointly owned. 
The court signed its Findings of Facts and Con-
clusions of Law and Dec:ree on September 23, 1967, 
which documents were entered in the records of the 
Weber Cou~ty Clerk on September 27, 1967. 
RELIEF SCUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that the decision of the 
lower court in respect to Senate Bill 30 be affirmed 
if the appeal is not disP11ssed as requested in Point 
I, infra. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents accept appellants' statement of 
facts in regard to age of appellants, the income of 
appellants, and the statute under which appellants 
applied for their abatement. Respondents also agree 
with appellants' statements concerning the findings 
made by the trial court and the subsequent action 
of the Weber County Board of Equalization. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPEAL IS IMPROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT FOR THE REASON THAT THE APPELLANTS 
HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH THEIR STATUTORY 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY. 
The action for declaratory judgment should 
have been dismissed by the lower court on the basis 
of appellants' failure to exhaust the administrative 
remedy provided for by statute. 
The Utah State Legislature has taken consider-
able effort to provide relief for taxpayers who feel 
that their property has been unfairly treated by the 
various county assessors, and who feel that their 
protestations have been ignored by the various ad-
ministrative bodies. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-1 (1963) provides that the 
county board of commissioners of each county shall 
constitute a county board of equalization which shall 
meet at specified times for the purpose of equaliz-
4 
ing the assesment of all property within a county 
and for the purpose of hearing complaints and mak-
ing the necessary adjustments. Utah Code Ann. § 
59-7-2 (1963) provides that this board of equalization 
may increase or lower the assessment and may also 
abate the taxes of an indigent person. It is further 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-10 (1963) that any 
person aggrieved or dissatisfied with the decision 
of the county board of equalization may appeal to 
the Utah State Tax Cornmission for review. 
Should the taxpayers make a proper applica-
tion to the Utah State Tax Commission, they would 
then have an opportunity to present their argument, 
asking for a determination of their liability for taxes 
assessed in view of apparent indigency, and then 
receive a decision from the Utah State Tax Commis-
sion which has appellate power from the various 
county boards of equalization. Utah Code Ann. § 
59-7-10 (1963). Should they be dissatisfied with this 
appellate determination. they could then file a writ 
of certiorari to the Utah State Supreme Court asking 
to have the determination of the Utah State Tax Com-
mission reviewed. County Board of Equalization of 
Kane County v. State Tax Comm'n, BR Utah 219, 50 
P.2d 418 (1935). 
The Legislature has also provided an alterna-
tive remedy. Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-11-11 (1963) per-
mits any taxpayer objecting to the "demands for 
public revenue" to pay said demanded revenue 11n-
der protest and file an action in any conrt of com-
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petent jurisdiction to recover those taxes he con-
siders unlawfully assessed or paid. 
That these administrative or other statutory 
remedies must be complied with before filing art 
action for declaratory iudgment as was done in this 
instance is clear: 
Declaratory relief is frequently denied in tax cases 
either on the ground that other adequate remedies 
exist or that special statutory remedies provided for 
tax cases are exclusive. The remedy in the state 
courts is ordinarily considered adequate if the tax-
payer may pay his taxes under protest and obtain 
an enforceable judgment for a refund. Declaratory 
relief has also been denied where the taxpayer is af-
forded a complete remedy by a state statute provid-
ing for appeal from an assessment, where he has a 
remedy by mandamus, where the statute provides 
for review by cPrtiorari of the tax commission's de-
termination, where there is a specific statutory pro-
ceeding for testing tax statutes, . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgment§ 38. 
This court in Shea v. State Tax Comm'n, 101 
Utah 209, 120 P.2d 274 (1941) has stated its agree-
ment with this philosophy: 
It is not for the tax commission to determine ques-
tion of legality or constitutionality of legislative en-
actments. In cases in which legality or illegality of 
tax sought to be recovered by taxpayer necessarily 
involves determination of questions of law calling 
for exercise of strictly judicial functions, payment 
under protest and compliance with other provisions 




THE INTERPRETATION DY THE LOWER COURT 
OF THE APPLICABILITY OF SENATE BILL 30 TO THE 
YEAR 1967 SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The lower court determined that the Legislature 
intended the filing limitation of Senate Bill 30 to 
apply only after the bill became law on May 9, 1967; 
and that the substantive provisions of Senate Bill 30 
should be coupled with the filing provisions of the 
former statute in grantina relief. (T. 69) 
Appellants state on page 13 of their brief that 
the application denied under Sennte Bill 30 must bt:-
reconsidered under Utah Code Ann. ~ 59-7-2 (1963), 
which appellants claim was in force in June. That 
section was in effect repealed on May 9, 1967, when 
the new amendment becan-1e effective. The provi-
sions of the former act could not have had any ef-
ficacy after May 9, 1867, and no abatement of any 
type could have been grnnted under the repealed 
section. 
The lower court, therefore, was faced with a 
serious dilemma. The repealed section obviously 
could not be applied. However, if the May 1st filing 
date of the present law were strictly applied, no per-
sons seeking abaternenl under the new provision 
cm1ld be granted relief. 'T'he res~1lt would be to elim-
inate abatement nf propert~r tc~Y for thrc:: indigent fo': 
the 1967 calendar year. 
The lower court reasoned that such a result 
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could not have been intended by the Legislature 
but rather that that body intended the filing limita-
tion to apply after the new provision became law. 
(T. 69) 
Thus the May 1st filing deadline would become 
applicable in the 1968 calendar year. 
Respondents submit that the lower court's in-
terpretation is based on sound reasoning and that 
said hoiding should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE HOLDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT 
SENATE BILL 30 IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF EQUAL PROTEC-
TION OF THE LAW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The principles stated in the United States Su-
preme Court cases cited in appellants' brief can be 
found in the decision of this Court in State v. Mason. 
94 Utah 501, 198 P.2d 920 (1938). As the Mason case 
has been almost uniformly cited as authority in sub-
sequent Utah State Supreme Court decisions con-
sidering equal protection questions, it can rightful-
ly be called a landmark decision. 
This Court in State v. Mason. supra, set forth 
certain criteria for determining whether or not a 
statute challenged on equal protection grounds is 
constitutional: 
1. Any law of necessity discriminates against 
one group or another in that it includes some within 
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its application and excludes others from its appli-
cation; 
2. The differentiation between those included 
and those excluded must not be unreasonable or 
arbitrary in nature; 
3. The reasonableness of the differentiation 
or discrimination must be directly related to the pur-
pose to be accomplished by the statute. 
In addition to these critieria, the Mason decision 
also provides guidelines for judicial perusual of a 
statute challenged on the grounds of unreasonable 
and arbitrary classification: 
1. In regard to reasonableness, the court can-
not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the 
legislative body. 
2. If the court finds a reasonable basis for dif-
ferentiation, the law must be upheld. 
3. There is a difference between a statute's 
wisdom and its constitutionality. 
Respondents do not deny that the purpose of 
Senate Bill 30 is to provide a relief for certain "in-
digent" persons. However, it cannot be denied that 
the Legislature is not required to provide the same 
type of relief for all persons. The Legislature has 
been given the power to determine who needs re-
lief and in what form so long as there is some basis 
for granting a certain type of relief to certain per-
sons classified in need of that type of relief. 
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A reading of the statute clearly indicates that 
the Legislature intended to offer a certain monetary 
boon to persons it considered in need of assistance 
but who were not presently receiving a monetary 
boon in the form of welfare grants constituting 50 
per cent or more of their income. 
It appears that the Legislature concluded that 
said persons, i.e., those receiving 50 per cent or 
more of their income from welfare grants, would 
be placed in a favored position if they were also 
granted the type of relief contemplated by Senate 
Bill 30. Respondent submits that such a conclusion 
is based on sound reasoning and that such con-
clusion can properly be made by the Legislature. 
Respondents foil to see that the definition of an 
indigent person as one whose income is less than 
$1500.00 is an unreasonable or arbitrary classifica-
t:on within the frame·work of Senate Bill 30. 
If it could be shown that all persons over 65 
years of age with an income of over $1500.00 were 
indigent, the Legislature's determination could prob-
ably be declared capricious. That, however, is not 
the case. 
Whether or not the Legislature would have 
been "wiser" to fix an amount other than $1500.00 
bears little relationship to the constitutional validity 
of the amount in question. 
Appellants' strongest argument would appear 
to be that in some instances the application of the 
Lw miqht work ri. hadship on some welfare recipi-
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ents whose grants constitute the major portion of 
their income. Nevertheless, respondents submit that 
the Legislature was attempting to achieve a balance 
among persons it deemed indigent by granting a 
certain type of relief to those not already receiving 
relief in another form. That the balance achieved 
may not always be perfect is not a basis for declar-
ing the statute invalid. 
POINT IV 
THE DETERMINATION RY THE LOWER COURT 
THAT THE $1500.00 INCOME LIMITATION APPLIED 
TO AN INDIVIDUAL AND THAT INCOME MUST BE 
APPORTIONED WHERE THE PROPERTY IS JOINT-
LY OWNED SHOlTLD BE AFFIRMED. 
Utah Att'y. Gen. Op. No. 67-058, issued August 
15, 1967. and concerninq Senate Bill 30 stated as 
follows: 
It is the opinion of this office that the $1500.00 
limitation applied to each individual making appli-
cation for the abatement. The countv board of 
equalzation should examine the facts t~ determine 
the actual owners of the property and, if it appears 
that both husband and wife are the owners, then 
allow an abatement where each have an income less 
than $1500.00. 
An earlier opinion dealing with the veteran's 
exemption determined that a veteran applying for 
an exemption was entitled to the full exemption 
even if the property were jointly owned by the vet-
eran and his or her spouse. Utah Att'y. Gen. Op. No. 
64-012, Feb. 25, 1964. Respondents submit that the 
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veteran exemption situf:l.tion is analogous to the in-
stant case and the reasoning of the cited opinion 
should be persuasive. 
The above opinions appear to be the only 
guides to interpreting the language of Senate Bill 
30. 
Respondents submit that the language of the 
statute is clear and the interpretation of that lan-
guage by the lower court is correct and should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Initially, respondents reiterate the contention 
that the appeal is not properly before this Court. If, 
however, the appeal is not dismissed, respondents 
submit that Senate Bill 30 is not violative of the con-
stitutional requirement of equal protection of the 
law; therefore, the decision of the lower court on 
that question should be affirmed. 
Based on Point II, respondents urge this Court 
to affirm the decision of the lower court regarding 
the application of the June 7th filing date to the 1967 
calendar year. 
Respondents submit that the language of Sen-
ate Bill 30 clearly directs an apportionment of the 
income with regard to property jointly owned by 
husband and wife and ask that the lower court's de-
cision on that point be affirmed. Respondents join 
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appellants in seeking an order from this Court di-
recting the Weber County Board of Equalization to 
comply with the order of the Second District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MARY J. COLBATH 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
